ECC2K-130 on Cell CPUs

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Technische Universiteit
Eindhoven
University of Technology

May 5, 2010

Africacrypt 2010, Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Breaking ECC2K-130

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How hard is the ECDLP?

The ECDLP

Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ and two points $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ and $Q \in \langle P \rangle$, find k such that $Q = [k]P$.

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- Reason: best known algorithm for most elliptic curves if n is prime: Pollard's rho algorithm, running time: $O(\sqrt{n})$

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Question in this talk

Given an elliptic curve E and two points P and Q as above and given a number of computers (or FPGAs, or ASICs, or money), how much time does it take to solve the specific ECDLP?

The Certicom challenges

1997: Certicom announces several ECDLP prizes:

> *The Challenge is to compute the ECC private keys from the given list of ECC public keys and associated system parameters. This is the type of problem facing an adversary who wishes to completely defeat an elliptic curve cryptosystem.*

Objectives:

> *1. To increase the cryptographic community's understanding and appreciation of the difficulty of the ECDLP.*
>
> *[...]*
>
> *6. To encourage and stimulate research in computational and algorithmic number theory and, in particular, the study of the ECDLP.*

Three levels of challenges

Level-0 challenges – exercises

Challenges of 79 bits, 89 bits, and 97 bits (size of $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$).

Level-0 challenges have all been solved

Level-1 challenges

Challenges of 109 bits, and 131 bits.

109-bit challenges have all been solved, 131-bit challenges have all *not* been solved, yet.

Level-2 challenges

Challenges of 163 bits, 191 bits, 239 bits, and 359 bits.

Level-2 challenges have all not been solved, yet.

The "next" open challenge: ECC2K-130

ECC2K-130

Elliptic curve E is the Koblitz curve $y^2 + xy = x^3 + 1$ over
$\mathbb{F}_{2^{131}} = \mathbb{F}_2[z]/(z^{131} + z^{13} + z^2 + z + 1)$
Point P of order $680564733841876926932320129493409985129 \approx 2^{129}$.
Point Q in $\langle P \rangle$
Find $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $Q = [k]P$

Claimed hardness of ECC2K-130

> *The 131-bit Level I challenges are expected to be infeasible against realistic software and hardware attacks, unless of course, a new algorithm for the ECDLP is discovered.*

(from Certicom's description of the challenges, mid-2009)

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The attacker

Currently 12 research institutes from (slightly extended) ECRYPT, European network of excellence in cryptography

Parallelized Pollard's rho algorithm

- Algorithm by van Oorschot and Wiener
- Declare an easy-to-recognize subset of $\langle P \rangle$ as *distinguished*
- Use client-server infrastructure

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- Client:
  - Generate random point $R_0 = [a_0]P + [b_0]Q$ from random seed s
  - Apply pseudo-random iteration function f to obtain $R_{i+1} = f(R_i)$
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- Server:
  - Search incoming distinguished points for duplicates (*collision*)
  - Use the information about the starting points (random seed) to obtain $R_d = [a_d]P + [b_d]Q$ and $R_d = [c_d]P + [d_d]Q$
  - Compute solution

$$Q = \frac{c_d - a_d}{d_d - b_d} P$$

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- Requires iteration function to preserve knowledge about the linear combination in P and Q.

Pollard rho iteration function and distinguished points

Distinguished points

We call a point $R = (x_R, y_R)$ distinguished, if $\mathrm{HW}(x_R)$ (the Hamming weight of x_R in normal-basis representation) is ≤ 34.

Iteration function

Our iteration function is

$$R_{i+1} = f(R_i) = \sigma^j(R_i) + R_i,$$

where σ is the Frobenius endomorphism and

$$j = ((\mathrm{HW}(x_{R_i})/2) \pmod 8) + 3.$$

Computing the iteration function

$$R_{i+1} = f(R_i) = \sigma^j(R_i) + R_i,$$

- One elliptic curve addition
- One application of σ^j
- One conversion to normal-basis representation
- One Hamming-weight computation

Computing the iteration function

$$R_{i+1} = f(R_i) = \sigma^j(R_i) + R_i,$$

- One elliptic curve addition
  - we use affine coordinates
  - 2 multiplications, 1 squaring, 6 additions and 1 inversion
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  - Two computations of the form x^{2^m} for $3 \leq m \leq 10$ (m-squaring)
- One conversion to normal-basis representation
- One Hamming-weight computation
- Inversions can be batched and performed using Montgomery's trick
- For large batch: Trade one inversion for 3 multiplications

Implementing the iteration function
on the Cell Broadband Engine (Playstation 3)

The technique of bitslicing

- Bernstein set new software speed records for batched binary-field arithmetic using bitslicing (CRYPTO 2009)
- Elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^{131}}$ can be represented as a sequence of 131 bits
- Instead of putting these 131 bits in, e.g., two 128-bit registers, put them in 131 registers, one register per bit
- Perform arithmetic by simulating a hardware implementation using bit-logical instructions such as `AND` and `XOR`
- Inefficient for one field operation, but can process 128 batched operations in parallel (for 128-bit registers)
- Use spills to the stack to overcome lack of registers

Implementing the iteration function
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Is bitslicing really better?

- Bernstein's record was on the Intel Core 2, the Cell is different
- Cell SPU: Only 1 bit-logical operation per cycle (Core 2: 3 operations per cycle)
- Cell SPU: 128 128-bit registers (Core 2: 16 128-bit registers)
- Cell SPU can do one load or store per bit operation (Core 2: 1 load per 3 bit operations)
- Cell SPU has to fit all code and active data set in only 256 KB of *local storage*. Bitslicing requires more memory (because of the high level of parallelism)

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Decision: Let's figure out what's best by implementing both, bitsliced and non-bitsliced, independently by two groups.

Cycles per iteration on each SPU

- 31 Jul: 2565 (non-bitsliced)

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- 30 Aug: 1180 (bitsliced)

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- 07 Sep: 1047 (bitsliced)

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- 10 Aug: 1587 (bitsliced)
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- 13 Oct: 871 (bitsliced)
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- 15 Oct: 789 (bitsliced)

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- 29 Oct: 749 (bitsliced)

What happened from 08/06 to 09/07?

From 6488 cycles to 1047 cycles

- Start with C++ implementation for the Core 2 (by Bernstein)
- Port to C (6488 cycles)
- Reimplement speed-critical parts in `qhasm` (high-level assembly language)
- Most important: degree-130 polynomial multiplication

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- Most important: degree-130 polynomial multiplication
  - Minimal number of bit operations: 11961 (`binary.cr.yp.to`)
  - Turn this into C code: doesn't compile
  - Decision: Sacrifice some bit operations
  - 2 levels of Karatsuba
  - Fast degree-32 polynomial multiplication (1286 bit operations)
  - Write scheduler to obtain code running in 1303 cycles (`qhasm`)
  - In total: 14503 cycles for degree-130 polynomial multiplication

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  - In total: 14503 cycles for degree-130 polynomial multiplication
- Also implement Hamming-weight computation, squarings, conditional squarings, polynomial reduction in `qhasm`

What happened from 09/07 to 10/15?

From 1047 cycles to 789 cycles

- Start with polynomial-basis representation of elements
- How about normal-basis representation?
- Advantages:
  - m-squarings are just rotations
  - Conversion to normal-basis is free
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- Disadvantage: Multiplications are slower
- Shokrollahi et al.: Efficient conversion from type-2 normal basis to polynomial basis and back (WAIFI 2007), improvements by Bernstein and Lange
- Use this conversion, apply polynomial multiplication, apply inverse conversion
- Conversion (of course) also implemented in `qhasm`
- Overhead for conversions is more than compensated by savings in m-squarings and basis conversion

What happened from 10/15 to 10/29?

From 789 cycles to 749 cycles

- Only 256 KB of local storage (LS): Batch size for Montgomery inversions of 14
- Idea: swap the active set of data between LS and main memory
- Has to be done explicitly using DMA transfers
- Transfers can be interleaved with computations ⇒ almost no overhead
- Increase Montgomery batch size to 512

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- 1262 NVIDIA GTX 295 graphic cards, *or*
- 3039 3-GHz Core 2 CPUs, *or*
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That's what Certicom calls infeasible?

> *The 131-bit Level I challenges will be require significantly more work, but may be within reach.*

(from Certicom's description of the challenges, updated November 10, 2009)

ECC2K-130 online

Progress of the attack: http://ecc-challenge.info
News: https://twitter.com/ECCchallenge

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Papers

Breaking ECC2K-130:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/541/
ECC2K-130 on Cell CPUs (Africacrypt 2010):
http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/077/
Type-II Optimal Polynomial Bases (WAIFI 2010):
http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/069/

... more on FPGAs and GPUs soon