A New RSA-Based Signature Scheme

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Africacrypt 2010

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- Only recently, in CRYPTO'09, Hohenberger and Waters (HW) presented the first hash-and-sign signature scheme that is solely secure under the RSA assumption.
- In this work: alternative RSA-based signature scheme with additional properties that are useful in privacy preserving systems.

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  2. There exist efficient (NIZK) protocols (in the ROM) to sign commited values.
  3. There exist efficient (NIZK) protocols (in the ROM) for proving knowledge of a signature without revealing it.

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  - Remaining type of forgery can be dealt with using the new proving techniques of HW.
  - In particular: integrate that for a string X all prefixes of X are processed as well.
  - Modified scheme still allows to reduce the first two forgeries to the RSA assumption (although the proof is slightly more complicated).

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- Disadvantages
  - Signatures are larger than in HW (by just a single exponent)
  - Signature generation and verification take more time
  - Until now: No efficient (NIZK) protocols for proving knowledge of a signature without revealing it. – Future Work!

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  - Zhou (Chin. Journ. of Elec.'01), Camenisch-Lysyankaya (SCN'02), Fischlin (PKC'03),

Complexity Assumption

Definition (RSA assumption (RSA))

Given an RSA modulus $n = pq$, where p, q are sufficiently large primes, a prime $\alpha < \phi(n)$ with $\gcd(\alpha, \phi(n)) = 1$, and an element $u \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, we say that the $(t_{\mathsf{RSA}}, \epsilon_{\mathsf{RSA}})$-RSA assumption holds if for all t_{RSA}-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$

$$\Pr\left[(x) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(n, u, \alpha),\ x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*,\ x^\alpha = u \bmod n\right] \leq \epsilon_{\mathsf{RSA}},$$

where the probability is over the random choices of u, n, α and the random coins of $\mathcal{A}$.

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- Let $X \in \{0,1\}^{l_X}$ and define $X^{(i)} := 0^{l_X - i} x_1 \dots x_i \in \{0,1\}^{l_X}$ for all $i \in [l_X]$. (Prefix of X that consists of the first i bits).

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  For convenience: $T(X) := \prod_{i=1}^{l_X} t(X^{(i)})$
- Lemma[HW]: Given $q = q(\kappa)$ distinct input values, the probability that $t(X)$ collides is negligible.

A New RSA-Based Signature Scheme $\mathcal{S}$ (slightly simplified)

- ***Gen***(1^κ): computes a balanced and safe RSA modulus $n = pq$ and three random generators e, f, g of $\mathcal{QR}_n$. Additionally, it draws $k \in_R \mathcal{K}$ and $s \in_R \{0,1\}^{l_X}$. $PK = (n, e, f, g, k, s)$, $SK = (p, q)$.

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- ***Sign***(SK, m): chooses $r \in_R \{0,1\}^{l_r}$ and $X \in_R \{0,1\}^{l_X}$:

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- ***Verify***(PK, m, σ): checks if it holds for (z, X, r) that

  $$z^{T(X)} \stackrel{?}{=} ef^m g^r \bmod n.$$

Security

Theorem

Assume the $(t_{RSA}, \epsilon_{RSA})$*-RSA assumption holds. Then,* $\mathcal{S}$ *is* (q, t, ϵ)*-secure against adaptive chosen message attacks provided that*

$$q = q_{RSA}, \quad t \approx t_{RSA},$$
$$\epsilon \leq 9ql_X\epsilon_{RSA}/2 + \mathit{negl}(\kappa).$$

Signing Message Blocks

- ***Gen***(1^κ): is the same as in our main RSA scheme except that it now chooses $u+2$ generators $e, f_1, \ldots, f_u, g$ of $\mathcal{QR}_n$.
- ***Sign***$(SK, m_1, \ldots, m_u,)$: to sign a message the signer draws random values $r \in \{0,1\}^{l_r}$ and $X \in \{0,1\}^{l_X}$. Next, it computes

$$z = \left(eg^r \prod_{i=1}^{u} f_i^{m_i} \right)^{1/T(X)} \mod n.$$

  The final signature is $\sigma = (z, X, r)$
- ***Verify***$(PK, m_1, \ldots, m_u, \sigma)$: to verify a signature (z, X, r) the verifier checks whether

$$z^{T(X)} \stackrel{?}{=} eg^r \prod_{i=1}^{u} f_i^{m_i} \mod n.$$

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- Idea: if u successfully proves knowledge of a commited value m, then s processes the corresponding commitment such that the result is a signature on m.

The End

Thank you for your attention. Any questions?